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The Defence of Hardship to Specific Performance Actions  
 
Introduction 
 
The decision of Evans v Robcorp  Pty Ltd[2014] QSC 26   is of interest as being an 
instance  where the defence of hardship ,in this case, financial hardship, was successfully 
pleaded in defence to a summary application for specific performance of a contract for the 
sale of land. Equity has always recognised the defence of hardship in response to an action 
for specific performance  which ,as an equitable remedy , might be refused in the discretion 
of the Court  (Hewett v Court (1983) 149 CLR 639 at 664). However, whilst the remedy is 
discretionary, there are certain accepted principles which have guided the courts in their 
application of this defence to particular facts. It is not a blanket defence to a claim for specific 
performance  where the buyer simply does not have the funds to complete the contract at the 
time when settlement is called for. Occasionally, a radical change in ,say for instance, the 
health of the defendant between contract and completion, perhaps coupled with a  long delay  
by a seller in calling for completion not being the fault of the buyer might enliven the defence 
(Patel v Ali [1984]1 Ch 283) 
 
Relevant facts 
 
Briefly, a buyer entered a contract for the purchase of land for $1.253 million in November 
2012  with settlement due in September 2013. The buyer had obtained development 
approval  in September 2012   to construct a 54 room motel on the site .Only $10,000 deposit 
was paid .The performance of the contract was guaranteed by a third party. The buyer failed 
to complete on the date of settlement on the grounds of impecuniosity. Evidence was adduced 
that neither the buyer or the guarantor had sufficient funds  which both had  expected to 
materialise from other projects prior to completion. Attempts had been made to resell the land 
by the buyer and to raise funds through from other investors,none of which was successful. 
The inference drawn from the evidence was that both the buyer and the guarantor did not 
have the funds at the date of contract but were hoping to be in funds  by the time of 
settlement. Peter Lyons J ultimately refused the decree  on the grounds of hardship. It is 
instructive to examine the authorities relied upon by his Honour. 
 
Analysis 
 
The seller argued that specific performance should be granted notwithstanding the admitted 
lack of funds,citing  Hutchinson J in Nicolas v Ingram [1958] NZLR 972 which suggested 
that the defence was not available if the hardship relied upon had arising between contract 
and completion. In that case, a buyer had entered into a contract upon the understanding, at 
that time, that she would have obtained financial support from family members. However, 
after contract, they withdrew their offer of  that support. Hutchinson J refused to accept the 
defence of hardship  as the circumstances had changed after contract  and that her hardship 
was "mere financial inability to complete" which he did not deem sufficient. This decision 
was followed in Queensland in Ready Construction Pty Ltd v Jenno[1984] 2 Qd R 78 where 
between contract and  the date for settlement buyers (a married couple ) separated, the 
husband lost his job ,had gained new employment but was, at the time of the 
hearing,  seriously ill and unlikely to remain in the new employment. Demack J ,in ordering 
the decree, considered that the primary factor was that the hardship must have existed at the 
date of contract and ,whilst relevant, the situation of the buyers at the time of settlement was 
as "secondary consideration."(at 80-81).This view was consistent with Nicolas v Ingram 
above. 
However, the  more recent New South Wales Supreme Court decision of Boyarsky  v Taylor 
[2008] NSWSC 1415 was raised by the buyers. Here, a buyer purchased a property at auction 
for $3.311 million and paid a deposit of $165,550 on the basis that the balance of purchase 
money could be raised through  the sale of a property worth between $6-$7 million  being the 
sale of matrimonial property following a Family Court  approved property settlement of 
which he was to receive %40 of the proceeds. In the meantime, the buyer had  unsuccessfully 
sought various avenues ,both through business associates and banks,  to raise the balance of 
funds including  trying to sell the previous matrimonial home. Brereton J considered a 
number of authorities   which underscored specific performance being a discretionary remedy 
and  recognising the defence of hardship generally (in relation to the position of both parties) 
and found   little by way of whether "difficulty in raising the purchase price  will sustain a 
defence of hardship or impossibility of performance” (at [34]).His Honour would have 
accepted  the defence of hardship if the buyer had to resort to "a lender of last resort" to 
borrow the balance of purchase money However, this may not have been necessary as the 
buyer had sufficient equity in the ex-matrimonial home on the market to finance the purchase 
which may become available "in a reasonable time" (at 44]).In other words, whilst it was not 
immediately possible to raise the funds, it was prospectively so and Brereton J ordered 
specific performance  with liberty to apply for time conditions presumably at a later date after 
the buyer had been put in funds from the sale of the ex-matrimonial home. 
  Peter Lyons J, in refusing the decree, was inclined to the view that hardship  need not only 
be hardship which must be shown to have existed at the date of contract but might be 
constituted by matters which have occurred since contract. However, His Honour found that 
,given these circumstances, that the  making the order would be  of little practical utility and 
that  the alternative ,damages would be an adequate remedy    
 
Conclusion 
 
 The decision is of interest given that the inability to pay the balance of purchase price at 
settlement as contracted would appear to be a common problem through  a variety of causes  
but  only in very limited instances ,might specific performance be refused upon the defence 
of  financial  hardship for that reason alone. Cases on this point are difficult to reconcile.It 
would seem pointless to order specific performance where it is obvious to the court  that  a 
buyer would never have the funds to settle ,the more appropriate remedy being  termination 
of the contract ,forfeiture of the deposit, and an action for  substantial damages (which may 
never be paid) brought to judgment. Thus, any buyer without funds to complete cannot ,upon 
that ground alone, plead the defence of hardship .There must be some other element  to 
engage the discretion of the court to accept the defence, whether it is a personal matter like 
health of the buyer or, conduct of the seller which caused the hardship alleged.  
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